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(RE)EVALUATING THE BURGER COURT 
L.A. Powe, Jr.* 
EARL M. MALTZ, THE COMING OF THE NIXON COURT: THE 1972 TERM AND 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (UNIVERSITY PRESS 
OF KANSAS 2016). PP. 262. HARDCOVER $34.95. 
MICHAEL J. GRAETZ AND LINDA GREENHOUSE, THE BURGER COURT AND 
THE RISE OF THE JUDICIAL RIGHT (SIMON AND SHUSTER 2016). PP. 480. 
HARDCOVER $30.00. PAPERBACK $18.00 
The Burger Court lacks the cache of the Courts preceding and succeeding it. Its 
majority opinions were written in a lengthy and deadly formulaic style.1 Its prime 
dissenters, William J. Brennan on the left and William Rehnquist on the right, were 
not natural dissenters like William O. Douglas and Antonin Scalia. Nor did the Court 
have outsized personalities like Douglas and Scalia. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger 
lacked both Earl Warren’s gravitas and Rehnquist’s intelligence; instead he was a 
pompous dullard. As such, few books find the Burger Court a worthy topic. 
The first three important books on the Burger Court were all relatively short. 
The first was a collection of essays, likely completed in 1980 or 1981, edited by Vin-
cent Blasi that carried the provocative subtitle “The Counter-Revolution that 
Wasn’t.”2 Next, and years after Warren Burger retired, was another collection of es-
says edited by Bernard Schwartz, where Mark Tushnet wrote that the Court was a 
“[t]riumph of Country-Club Republicanism.”3 A volume by Earl Maltz in the largely 
unread South Carolina series on the Court followed this.4 It went way beyond Blasi 
and Tushnet by implausibly arguing that the Court “produced the most liberal juris-
prudence in history—even more liberal than that generated by its predecessor.”5 
Most recently Kevin McMahon focused on Richard Nixon’s meaning when he stated 
he could appoint “strict constructionists” to the Court.6 He demonstrated that Nixon 
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 2. THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN’T (Vincent Blasi, ed., 1983). 
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only cared about criminal procedure and school desegregation, and that his Court 
prevailed on those issues. Now, Maltz has written another book, looking at the first 
full term when the four Nixon appointees were together, while Michael Graetz and 
Linda Greenhouse offer the most complete discussion of Burger’s seventeen-year 
Chief Justiceship to date.7 Both books are well researched and take advantage of the 
available papers of the justices. 
In March, 1969, before Nixon had selected him to succeed Warren, Burger 
wrote a letter to his best friend, Eighth Circuit Judge Harry Blackmun where, refer-
ring to the Court, he claimed, “RN can only straighten that place out if he gets four 
appointments.”8 Within barely two and a half years of that letter, Nixon had his four, 
adding Lewis Powell and Rehnquist to Burger and Blackmun. Yet, at least three of 
the four were not  ideologues. Rehnquist was a Goldwater Republican from Arizona, 
but Burger and Blackmun were Country-Club (or Eisenhower or Rockefeller) Re-
publicans from Minnesota, and Powell would have been one too had he come from 
the North instead of Virginia. Along with Warren Court holdovers, Potter Stewart, a 
Country-Club Republican from Ohio, and Byron White, a moderate Colorado Dem-
ocrat who was pro-civil rights but tough on crime, the Court had a very solid middle 
between Brennan and Thurgood Marshall on one side and Rehnquist on the other. 
If the four Nixon appointees voted together, they would prevail unless all five Warren 
Court holdovers voted together (and Stewart and White had been frequent dissenters 
in criminal procedure decisions). As Maltz aptly notes, the centrists had the values 
generally held by the affluent, well-educated white Protestant community “from 
which all . . . were drawn.”9 
I. BEGINNINGS 
I clerked during the 1970 Term, the first where the Burger Court had its full 
complement of nine justices. From my perspective then—and now—it was obvious 
that this was not the Warren Court. Maltz’s implausible claim in his first Burger Court 
book was simply wrong. To be sure there were big liberal victories. Massive bussing 
was ordered in the urban South and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act was interpreted 
as enshrining disparate impact.10 Refusing to enjoin publication of the Pentagon Papers 
and protecting the slogan “Fuck the Draft” were, and are, major First Amendment 
landmarks.11 The Court blocked financial aid to parochial schools and created a cause 
of action against federal officials for constitutional violations.12 These decisions are 
                                                          
CONSEQUENCES 113 (2011). 
 7. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & LINDA GREENHOUSE, THE BURGER COURT AND THE RISE OF THE JUDICIAL RIGHT 
(2016); EARL M. MALTZ, THE COMING OF THE NIXON COURT: THE 1972 TERM AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2016). 
 8. GRAETZ & GREENHOUSE, supra note 7, at 4. 
 9. MALTZ, supra note 7, at 192. Graetz and Greenhouse agree, but it puts the number of centrist justices at four, 
pairing Burger with Rehnquist. GRAETZ & GREENHOUSE, supra note 7, at 6-7. 
 10. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 32 (1971); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 
424, 429-31, 436 (1971). 
 11. N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971). 
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more important than the more numerous conservative victories—although the latter 
were not unimportant.13 
To mention just a matching five, the Court upheld capital punishment against 
claims of standardless sentencing and the lack of bifurcated juries;14 it gutted Dom-
browski v. Pfister’s authorization for federal courts to enjoin unconstitutional state 
criminal prosecutions;15 it allowed un-Mirandized confessions to be used in grand 
jury proceedings;16 it found nothing wrong with Jackson, Mississippi closing its pub-
lic swimming pools to avoid desegregating them;17 and it cut back on the promise of 
Stanley v. Georgia by allowing the government to prevent willing adults from acquiring 
obscene pictures.18 
Three little known, or unknown, decisions illustrated the major divide between 
this Court and its predecessor. At one point in time, there were five votes on an 
opinion to overrule Mapp v. Ohio, although of course that did not happen.19 The Court 
issued an injunction, sought by the Nixon Administration, against an anti-war protest 
on the Mall.20 The Court granted certiorari in an urban renewal (aka Negro removal) 
case; then over the objections of those voting to grant the Court refused to stay the 
bulldozers;after an unnecessary oral argument the Court dismissed it as improvidently 
granted.21 
As Maltz describes it, the 1972 Term looks a lot like the 1970 Term. He covers 
eight substantive areas: voting, obscenity, criminal procedure, school desegregation, 
equality and wealth, gender discrimination, aid to parochial schools, and abortion. In 
each chapter, he first quickly details the law as it existed prior to the 1972 Term and 
then describes the process by which the cases were decided.22 Liberals (Brennan, 
Marshall, and Douglas) were sometimes able to attract at least two necessary votes to 
prevail, while sometimes conservatives (Burger and Rehnquist) won as well, being 
able to attract three or more from that large middle group. Sometimes the Court 
opened new avenues of constitutional law; the gender discrimination cases and Roe v. 
Wade are well known, the aid to parochial schools less so.23 In obscenity and issues 
                                                          
403 U.S. 388, 397-98 (1971). 
 13. It probably merits mention that Muhammad Ali’s conviction for refusing to report for draft induction was, 
to everyone’s surprise, unanimously reversed. Clay v. United States, 403 U.S. 698, 705 (1971). In 2014 HBO created a 
movie about the case which properly emphasizes the role played by a Harlan clerk in producing the result. 
MUHAMMAD ALI’S GREATEST FIGHT (HBO 2013). 
 14. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 221-22 (1971). 
 15. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41, 53 (1971); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486, 497-98 (1965). 
 16. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971).  
 17. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 227 (1971). 
 18. United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 357 (1971); United States v. 37 Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376-77 
(1971); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969). 
 19. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 453 (1971); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); BOB 
WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 112-19 (1979) (discussing five 
justices’ votes to overrule Mapp in Coolidge). 
 20. BOB WOODWARD AND SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT, 133-36 (dis-
cusses Vietnam Veterans Against the War). 
 21. Triangle Improvement v. Ritchie, 402 U.S. 497 (1971). 
 22. The two exceptions are the chapters on Obscenity and Equal Protection and Wealth where the discussions 
of the prior law are extensive. 
 23. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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of poverty the Court called retreat; the latter produced the most revealing internal 
discussions I have read. In school desegregation it looked both ways. And in the cases 
of voting and criminal procedure it left the status quo untouched.24 
With White joining the four Nixon appointees the Court retreated back to the 
1950s in obscenity doctrine. Dueling memoranda from the two had presaged the 
Burger majorities and the Brennan dissents in Miller v. California and Paris Adult Theatre 
I v. Slaton.25 Brennan wanted to relieve the institutional strain on the Court by limiting 
prosecutions to cases involving nonconsenting adults and juveniles while Burger 
“brimmed with indignation” at what he saw “as efforts to subvert traditional stand-
ards of morality and civility.”26 Burger’s victory ironically solved Brennan’s prob-
lem—because Burger always had five votes there was rarely any need to revisit the 
area. 
In writing about the Warren Court, I have suggested that it was moving toward 
a special constitutional status for the less well-off in society—something along the 
lines of Frank Michelman’s famous Harvard Foreword.27 Had Hubert Humphrey 
won the 1968 squeaker, he would have had the four seats Nixon filled and those 
Warren Court seeds would have blossomed. But Nixon won, and rights for the poor 
died still-born.28 Maltz extensively discussed the two cases that ended the short-lived 
quest to give added protections to the poor, United States v. Kras and San Antonio Inde-
pendent School District v. Rodriguez.29 In the former, White provided the fifth vote for 
Blackmun’s majority, while in the latter Stewart provided the fifth vote while Powell 
authored the majority opinion. In both cases Marshall wrote angry dissents. 
Kras, who was indigent, claimed he lacked the $50 in fees to avail himself of a 
voluntary personal bankruptcy.30 Previously, in the 1970 Term, the Court had held 
that indigents could not be denied access to divorce if they could not pay the required 
fees.31 Blackmun’s opinion agreed with statements by Burger and Powell that a state 
had a monopoly on divorce, but there was an alternative to bankruptcy through pri-
vate negotiations with creditors.32 Furthermore, Blackmun’s opinion picked up on 
Powell’s observation that at a savings of $1.27 (three packs of cigarettes) a week, Kras 
could amass the fee.33 Whether Kras smoked was not considered and the more likely 
explanation was White’s assertion that the claim was “close to frivolous.”34 
                                                          
 24. In criminal procedure, that was because the Court did not decide important cases. Maltz did not have to 
discuss the 1972 cases outlawing capital punishment as it was practiced, because they came in the Term that started 
with only two Nixon appointees on the Court. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).   
 25. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973). 
 26. MALTZ, supra note 7, at 63. 
 27. LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 445-55 (2000); Frank Michelman, 
Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 7 (1969). 
 28. L.A. Powe, Jr., Griswold and Its Surroundings: The 1963, ’64, and ’65 Terms, 64 Am. U. L. Rev. 1443, 1462 (2015). 
 29. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 30. Kras, 409 U.S. at 436-37.  
 31. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). 
 32. Kras, 409 U.S. at 445.  
 33. MALTZ, supra note 7, at 113. 
 34. Id.  
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Rodriguez was a block-buster challenge to Texas’ use of local property taxes to 
fund public schools.35 Two school districts within San Antonio highlighted the vast 
disparities under the Texas system. Englewood families had a median income of 
$4,681 while Alamo Heights families had $8,001.36 The assessed property value per 
pupil in Englewood was $5,690, which at its tax rate of $1.05/$100.00 valuation 
yielded $356 per pupil.37 Alamo Heights had an assessed value of $49,000 per pupil 
and at its tax rate of $0.85/$100.00 it raised $594 per pupil.38 Plaintiffs might well 
have said “res ipsa loquitor.” 
The Nixon justices did not take plaintiffs’ claims seriously, and to the extent 
they did, the four were horrified. Powell, a former member of the Richmond School 
Board and the Virginia Board of Education, saw the plaintiffs’ claims as a first step 
toward national control of education—“a regime Powell associated with totalitarian 
governments.”39 Even if funding were placed and left at the state level, he saw prob-
lems because with the purse strings comes control, and local control “has been the 
most dynamic force behind the overall effectiveness of our public school system.”40 
Further, he questioned “the relationship between expenditures and [the] quality of 
public education.”41 But it did not matter. In his notes he described the plaintiffs’ 
theory as a “‘communist’ doctrine that had no place in a society based on the principle 
of free enterprise.”42 Blackmun had a similar thought. If plaintiffs prevailed there 
would be “a disinteresting equality with no one getting anything that is very good. 
This smacks of the type of thing that emerged from the French Revolution.”43 As a 
Marxist would predict, it was a class issue and the majority voted its class.44 
Everyone also worried about the problems of judicial intervention, entering an 
“educational thicket[, which] would be far worse than the reapportionment area,” 
overhauling “the fiscal and taxation structures across the land.”45 So, education was 
not a fundamental right and the Texas scheme, similar to those of all states except 
Hawaii, was rational. 
School desegregation looked like an advance when bussing was extended to a 
northern city in Keyes v. Denver School District over Rehnquist’s dissent and a partial 
dissent by Powell arguing against using bussing as a remedy.46 But a 4-4 split in a 
                                                          
 35. Id. at 116.  
 36. Id. at 117.  
 37. Id.  
 38. MALTZ, supra note 7, at 119. 
 39. Id. at 117. 
 40. Id. at 120 (quoting Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Supreme Court Justice, to Larry Hammond 5 
(October 12, 1972), available at http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/71-1332_SanAntonioRodri-
guezBasic3.pdf)). 
 41. Id. at 119. 
 42. Id. at 118 (quoting Conference Notes by Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Supreme Court Justice, 2 (October 9, 1972), 
available at http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/71-1332_SanAntonioRodriguezBasic3.pdf). 
 43. MALTZ, supra note 7, at 120 (quoting Memorandum from Justice Harry A. Blackmun Papers (on file in the 
Manuscript Division at the Library of Congress)). 
 44. Amazingly Rodriguez is never mentioned in John C. Jeffries’ 600 plus page biography. JOHN C JEFFRIES, JR., 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL: A BIOGRAPHY (1994).  
 45. Id. at 119 (quoting Blackmun); Id. (quoting Burger). 
 46. 413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
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cross-district desegregation case out of Richmond pointed in the other direction.47 
Given Powell’s embrace of local control and antipathy toward bussing, there was no 
doubt he would have been the fifth vote to reject cross-district bussing had he not 
been recused. That, of course proved the case the next Term.48 
The real areas of advance were in gender discrimination, including abortion, 
(where Maltz offers nothing new) and the rejection of most aid to parochial schools. 
The former were in line with the spirit of the times and were issues on which the 
justices could be lobbied by the women in their lives. The latter corresponded to the 
hostility to Roman Catholicism that had yet to be softened by the realization that 
Vatican II had fundamentally changed the Catholic Church. 
The principal gender discrimination case, Frontiero v. Richardson, started as a 
Brennan opinion that did not mention making gender—“sex” as it was then called—
a suspect classification, but changed due to Brennan’s observation that ratification of 
the then-pending Equal Rights Amendment was a “lost cause.”49 The observation 
was prescient, but rather early, since the ERA had only been sent to the states in 
March of the previous year.50 Getting a majority opinion in 1973, for holding that 
the Fourteenth Amendment was already an ERA, was a cause lost from its inception. 
Eight justices found the military’s policy of automatically treating wives—but not 
husbands—as dependents was unconstitutional; but four justices, supposedly, relied 
on the rational basis test.51 
There were, by far, more amicus briefs filed in Lemon v. Kurtzman than any other 
case during the 1970 Term. Catholic briefs lovingly praised the program of aiding 
(private but overwhelmingly) parochial schools. Protestants and Jews saw Jefferson’s 
wall of separation between church and state being dismantled. Collectively the briefs 
looked like religious warfare over tax dollars. The same pattern repeated itself in the 
1972 Term with the same results in blocking aid.52 Non-Catholics applauded the de-
cisions; thus even the normally critical Wall Street Journal found the decisions as 
“perfectly consistent with the spirit and intent of the Founding Fathers.”53 
II. ENDINGS 
Seven of the nine justices of the 1972 Term served for the remainder of the 
Burger Court that Graetz and Greenhouse describe. The Court lost its most liberal 
member—Douglas—in 1975 and Stewart, six years later. Both were replaced by Re-
publican presidents appointing Country-club Republicans, John Paul Stevens, and 
                                                          
 47. Bradley v. State Bd. of Educ., 412 U.S. 92 (1973). 
 48. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
 49. 411 U.S. 677 (1973); MALTZ, supra note 7, at 143. 
 50. Unlike Brennan, Powell thought the ERA would be ratified. GRAETZ & GREENHOUSE, supra note 7, at 172-
173. 
 51. Richardson, 411 U.S. at 690-691.  
 52. Comm. for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 
(1973). Tushnet writes that the “Country-club Republicans were, at their core, WASPs, and the ‘P’ meant something.” 
TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 208. 
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Sandra Day O’Connor respectively. The Graetz and Greenhouse book is intention-
ally set against Blasi’s “Counter-Revolution That Wasn’t.”54 The authors detail a con-
servative Court undermining (but not overruling) Warren Court precedents.55 Yet 
anyone aware of Blasi’s book is someone who follows the Court closely enough to 
know how it kept moving to the right. The book is welcome because it is a readable 
full treatment of the Burger Court, but its thesis is not news. 
The book is arranged under five headings: Crime, Race, Social Transformation, 
Business, and the Presidency.56 In each area the authors describe the trajectory of the 
Burger Court decisions, typically but not invariably to the right, and then they briefly 
carry the area foreword to the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, to illustrate an even 
more rightward trend.57 The exception to this being, the two chapters on the presi-
dency where presidential powers were increased, with the exception of Nixon and his 
tapes. This is neither liberal nor conservative, because both parties like presidential 
power when they hold the presidency, and both are skeptical when the other party 
holds the presidency. 
The first crime chapter covers the well-trod capital punishment jurisprudence, 
but omits Batson where the Court corrected an extreme Warren Court blind spot.58 
The second chapter is “Taming the Trilogy.”59 Anyone teaching criminal procedure 
knows that while Mapp,60 Miranda,61 and Gideon62 remain the law, each has been hol-
lowed out: Mapp by the good faith exception and a cost benefit analysis,63 Miranda by 
a public safety exception and lax waiver standard, and Gideon by a refusal to take the 
need for competent counsel seriously.64 For those who did not know this, Graetz 
and Greenhouse make it unmistakably clear. They also document the limiting of ha-
beas and the shameful unwillingness to monitor prosecutorial overreaching in plea 
bargaining.65 
The two chapters on race are split between public schools and affirmative ac-
tion in higher education. “Still Separate, Still Unequal” is the title of the former chap-
ter. Still Separate refers to the refusal to allow cross-district bussing. Still Unequal 
refers to Rodriguez allowing major funding disparities between districts.66 The discus-
sion of the latter is cursory when compared to Maltz, but like Maltz, the authors 
                                                          
 54. BLASI, supra note 2.  
 55. GRAETZ & GREENHOUSE, supra note 7.  
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 59. GRAETZ & GREENHOUSE, supra note 7, at 42. 
 60. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).  
 61. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 62. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 63. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) 
 64. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979); Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  
 65. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978). 
 66. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) 
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emphasize that Powell “abhorred any sacrifice of quality education by whites in pur-
suit of desegregation.”67 Stephen Breyer, dissenting in Parents Involved, claimed that 
the 2007 case “threaten[s] the promise of Brown.”68 He was thirty-three years late. 
The affirmative action story of Bakke69 is the story of Powell. As his biographer 
tells it, Powell was “[f]aced with two intellectually coherent, morally defensible, and 
diametrically opposed positions” to either validate all such programs or hold them 
unconstitutional and he “chose neither.”70 Powell’s opinion, drawing no support 
from any other justice became the operative law, allowing admissions committees to 
pretty much do as they pleased, so long as they did so in the name of diversity. That 
was not a high bar. Yet, as the authors cogently observe, by asserting it was a univer-
sity’s right to have a diverse student body, Powell “essentially disabled minority ap-
plicants from advancing any legal claim (in the absence of intentional discrimination, 
of course). However it simultaneously allowed disappointed white applicants to claim 
their rejection was illegal because it was based on race.”71 Whites thus could claim 
rights, while minorities could not. It seemed backwards. 
The two best chapters in the book are those on abortion and gender discrimi-
nation. The justices never saw the reaction to Roe v. Wade coming.72 They were initially 
willing to decide it by the seven-man Court and had “every reason to suppose that 
they were embracing a broad national consensus.”73 Blackmun’s opinion is about 
empowering doctors, and as such, minimizes the woman’s interest in the decision 
(and how it would affect her career). A Powell clerk raised this point with his justice, 
but there is no evidence Powell did anything.74 
In contrast to the cursory discussion of Rodriguez, the authors give a full descrip-
tion of the decisions to deny federal and state funding for abortions even as the other 
medical needs of the poor received funding. A Powell memo was blunt: “The source 
of deprivation—indigency—is not action of the state.”75 Harris v. McRae noted that 
the lack of federal funding “leaves an indigent woman with at least the same range of 
choice in deciding whether to obtain a medically necessary abortion as she would 
have had if Congress had chosen to subsidize no health care costs at all.”76 The in-
difference Maltz illustrated with Rodriguez is here too, as the authors assert “[t]his was 
Warren Burger’s Constitution in the raw.”77 
                                                          
 67. GRAETZ & GREENHOUSE, supra note 7, at 89. Amazingly, the authors never mention Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 
202 (1982) where Powell provided the fifth vote to invalidate Texas’ policy of denying public education to undocu-
mented children.  
 68. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 868 (2007) (dissent). 
 69. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 70. JEFFRIES, supra note 44, at 469. 
 71. GRAETZ & GREENHOUSE, supra note 7, at 127. 
 72. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 73. GRAETZ & GREENHOUSE, supra note 7, at 139. 
 74. Id. at 146. 
 75. Id. at 156. 
 76. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S 297, 317 (1980). 
 77. GRAETZ & GREENHOUSE, supra note 7, at 160. The authors never mention Kras, which would also support 
their conclusion. 
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The chapter on sexual equality has two themes: advocate Ruth Bader Gins-
burg’s efforts to get the nine men to understand that laws based on gender stereo-
typing violated the Equal Protection Clause for that reason, and the inability of the 
nine men to see legal disabilities based on pregnancy as sexual discrimination. Gins-
burg kept winning, but never was able to convince the justices to see the big picture.78 
Interestingly, Graetz and Greenhouse seem less interested in the fact that outside of 
pregnancy—which was easily cured by a federal statute—that the women always won, 
instead of the fact that the authors wish they had won differently.79  
Three things stand out in the discussion of gay rights that, for the Burger Court, 
ended with Bowers v. Hardwick.80 The first is how much the justices wished to avoid 
the issue. The second is Powell’s ambivalence (which is so at odds with his steadfast 
support for Roe.) The third is Burger’s over-the-top reaction to the case which he 
claimed “presents for me the most far reaching issue of those thirty years [he spent 
on the bench].”81 
The final chapter on social issues concerns religion and especially the cases de-
cided after Catholics and Evangelicals found themselves as part of the winning 
Reagan coalition. As the authors describe, it “offered a preferred place at the consti-
tutional table, religion emerged from the Burger Court stronger and emboldened, 
with new weapons at hand for the battles that lay ahead.”82 This without adopting 
the conservative view that Lemon was a lemon. The cases that the authors rely on are 
Mueller v. Allen and Lynch v. Donnelly.83 
Minnesota allowed tax deductions for tuition and school supplies.84 Pawtucket, 
Rhode Island had an annual Christmas display that featured a Nativity scene, as well 
as candy canes, reindeer, and a sleigh, plus a banner reading “Seasons Greetings.”85 
Over the dissents of Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, the Court upheld 
both situations over Establishment challenges.86 In the former, the law was facially 
neutral between religious and secular schools, and the decision of where to send a 
child was left to private choice.87 That was enough. In the latter, the city was cele-
brating a holiday and encouraging shopping. Nor was there divisiveness: “A litigant 
cannot, by the very act of commencing a lawsuit . . . create the appearance of divi-
siveness and then exploit it as evidence of entanglement.”88 
Normally, invalidating restrictions on speech have been celebrated by liberals. 
But the first of the two chapters on business describe three invalidations that the 
                                                          
 78. Id. at 174. 
 79. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000(e) (1978); 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (an amendment to the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit sex discrimination on the basis of pregnancy). 
 80. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 81. GRAETZ & GREENHOUSE, supra note 7, at 209. 
 82. Id. at 217. 
 83. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983). 
 84. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 388, 393 n.2. 
 85. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 668, 671.  
 86. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 668; Mueller, 463 U.S. at 388. 
 87. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 399, 401. 
 88. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 684-85. 
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authors question from the left. The first is the extension of First Amendment pro-
tections for commercial speech over a solo dissent by Rehnquist.89 The authors cel-
ebrate Rehnquist as the prescient member of the Court. He wrote that the Court’s 
logic “will be open not only for dissemination of price information but for active 
promotion of prescription drugs, liquors, cigarettes, and other products the use of 
which has previously been thought desirable to discourage.”90 Without the protection 
of commercial speech, parents would have no occasion to answer their child’s ques-
tion: “what is erectile dysfunction?” 
One of the most significant First Amendment decisions, Buckley v. Valeo, in-
volved campaign finance regulation.91 Among other things, the post-Watergate cam-
paign finance regulations limited candidate spending, spending by third parties inde-
pendent of the candidate, and contributing to candidates. Rushing to judgment in 
advance of the 1976 campaigns, the Court created a nearly 150 page per curium with 
parts written by Burger, Brennan, Stewart, Powell, and Rehnquist.92 The Court sus-
tained the limitations on contributions because of the compelling interest in avoiding 
corruption or the appearance thereof. In striking down the spending limitations, the 
Court rejected the political equality arguments offered in support of the law. “[T]he 
concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in 
order to enhance the . . . voice of others is . . . foreign to the First Amendment . . . 
.”93 Under Buckley, money could flow freely into the electoral process one way or 
another. This was the Magna Carta for billionaires like Tom Steyer and the Koch 
brothers. Candidate arms races for dollars became the order of the day. 
In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, decided two years later, the Court in-
validated a Massachusetts law that prohibited expenditures by business corporations 
for the purpose of influencing a referendum (other than one affecting the corpora-
tion).94 Powell noted that the commercial speech case had already authorized corpo-
rate speech and restricting it based on its source “would be a most serious infringe-
ment of First Amendment rights.”95 In Bellotti, he offered the standard First 
Amendment idea that “the people in our democracy are entrusted with the responsi-
bility for judging and evaluating the relative merits of conflicting arguments.”96 
While discussing the Bellotti dissenters, the authors do not comment on the fact 
that this was the oddest four-justice dissent of the Burger Court: the two justices most 
sympathetic to First Amendment claims, Brennan and Marshall, and the two least 
sympathetic to First Amendment claims, Rehnquist and White. However, the authors 
do come to the support of Samuel Alito for his “not true” response to President 
                                                          
 89. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 786 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
 90. Id. at 781. 
 91. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 1-2 (1976). 
 92. GRAETZ & GREENHOUSE, supra note 7, at 258. 
 93. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49. 
 94. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
 95. GRAETZ & GREENHOUSE, supra note 7, at 263. 
 96. First Nat’l Bank of Bos., 435 U.S. at 791. 
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Obama’s 2010 State of the Union Address attack on Citizens United as overruling a 
century of law. “What the Court had done [in Citizens United] was take a logical step 
along the path the Burger Court had paved in its Buckley and Bellotti decisions.”97 
With the exception of Washington v. Davis, where the Court held that equal pro-
tection required intentional discrimination, the cases discussed in the second business 
chapter are less well known to constitutional law scholars.98 The rejection of disparate 
impact in Washington v. Davis was done without briefing or oral argument on the issue, 
and initially “the justices regarded it as just one among many, and not a very interest-
ing one at that.”99 After argument the justices found it quite interesting; White, the 
eventual author of the opinion, asserted “[t]he test [used by the city] was neutral and 
the Constitution requires no more.”100 If there was doubt about what Washington v. 
Davis meant, that was wholly removed three years later in Massachusetts v. Feeney, where 
the same 7-2 Court upheld a civil service veteran’s preference even though it severely 
restricted women’s opportunities.101 “When the basic classification is rationally 
based, uneven effects upon particular groups within a class are ordinarily of no con-
stitutional concern.”102 
During the Burger Court the Democratic Party coalition was fracturing as labor 
unions and civil rights groups fought over a declining share of the economic pie, 
especially during the 1979-1983 recession. Sharing the rightward move of the country, 
the Court favored management against labor103 and seniority against equal oppor-
tunity.104 
CONCLUSION 
These are two worthwhile books. Maltz offers as good of a discussion of a 
single term as exists, and Graetz and Greenhouse have pushed any new volume on 
the Burger Court well into the future. The similarities between the books abound, 
especially the featuring Lewis Powell. This stems from the fact that he was the most 
important centrist, but even more because of the incredibly candid notes he wrote. 
He told his clerks and posterity what he was thinking and why. Graetz and Green-
house also make a continuing theme of their business chapters a memorandum Pow-
ell wrote (before he came to the Court) to the Chamber of Commerce urging an 
aggressive effort in litigation (especially with amicus briefs) and the media to support 
business interests against unions, civil rights groups, environmentalists, and govern-
ment regulation.105 The other key similarity is the authors’ focus on the country club 
                                                          
 97. GRAETZ & GREENHOUSE, supra note 7, at 266; Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 
(2010). 
 98. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). 
 99. GRAETZ & GREENHOUSE, supra note 7, at 289. 
 100. Id. at 290. 
 101. Pers. Admin of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 256-57 (1979). 
 102. Id. at 272. 
 103. GRAETZ & GREENHOUSE, supra note 7, at 275-78. 
 104. Id. at 279-95. 
 105. Id. at 237-40, 253, 255, 267-68, 277, 342. The memorandum did not surface until after Powell was confirmed. 
Jack Anderson characterized it as “so militant that it raises a question about his fitness to decide any case involving 
business interests.” Id. at 239.   
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Republicans in the center between the Court’s two wings. These justices explain why 
there was neither a continuation of the Warren Court nor the conservatism of the 
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts. The centrists were neither counter-revolutionaries 
nor Jacobins; no, the proper analogy is Thermidor. 
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